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BOOK REVIEW
By
CAROL A. B. WARREN, with essays by STEPHEN J. MORSE and JACK
THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW.

ZUSMAN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. xii + 265 pp.,
index. $25.00.
DONALD H.J. HERMANN*

In 1978, after a year of study, the President's Commission on
Mental Health opened its final report with the observation that "a
substantial number of Americans do not have access to mental
health care of high quality ... at a reasonable cost."1 The Commission attributed this situation to the fact that mental health facilities were often at considerable distance from the persons in
need of treatment and also to the influence of personal factors such
as "race, age or sex"2 on the nature and availability of mental
health services. The Commission did not, however, limit its concern to the adequacy and delivery of mental health services, but
also indicated concern about the institutional structure in which
mental health laws are applied.
In its report, the Commission's concern with the legal environment in which the mental health system operates was reflected in
several recommendations for protecting the basic rights of patients.3 These rights specifically included the patient's right to select the best mental health services to meet his or her needs and
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, DePaul University. A.B., 1965, Stanford University; J.D., 1968, Columbia University; LL.M., 1974, Harvard University;, M.A., 1979, Ph.D.,
1981, Northwestern University.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, 1978 REPORT (1978). The report was accompanied by three volumes of appendices which contain a large number of task panel reports submitted to the Commission and covering a broad range of topics including mental
health service delivery, specific mental health problems, and legal issues relating to mental
health. See generally, 2-4 PREsIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, TASK PANEL REPORTS
(1978).
2. 2-4 PREsiDENT's COMM'N ON MeAL HEALTH, TASK PANEL REPORTS vii (1978).
3. Id. at 42-45.
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the right to refuse treatment." In addition, the Commission's general recommendations called for the establishment of a mental
health advocacy system," prohibition of all discrimination against
mentally disabled persons,' limitation of legal guardianships to
specific, demonstrated incapacities of individuals, 7 and application
of confidentiality rules to mental health records.8 With regard to
reform of the laws governing commitment, the Commission made
certain very specific suggestions, including statutory recognition of
the following rights:
i) a right to treatment/right to habitation and to protection
from harm for involuntarily confined mental patients and developmentally disabled individuals;
ii) a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting;
iii) a right to refuse treatment, with careful attention to the
circumstances and procedures under which the right may be qualified; and
iv) a right to due process when community placement is being
considered.'
These recommendations are consistent with much of what has
come to be conventional wisdom in the field of mental health law
and have, in fact, already been implemented to a great extent in
those states which have adopted new comprehensive mental health
codes, such as California and Illinois.1"
While these recommendations do not seem startling today, it
is important to note that these kinds of recommendations were, if
considered at all, thought to be extremely radical only slightly over
two decades ago. A sense of the timidity of those supporting
mental health reform in the early sixties can be gleaned from the
recommendations in the Final Report of the Joint Commission on
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 44.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, California Health Act of 1967, CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5000-5550 (West 1982) [hereinafter cited as LPS]; Mental Health Developmental
Disabilities Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91
§§ 1-100 to 6-107 (West 1982). See also GOVERNOR'S COmm'N FOR REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILLINOIS 1976 REPORT (1976);
GOVERNOR'S COWM'N FOR REWSION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILLINOIS 1977 REPORT

(1977).
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Mental Illness and Health issued in 1961.11 Recommendations in
that report, which emphasized the need for funding studies and
the development of treatment programs, placed major stress on the
need for public education as to the nature of mental illness and the
provision of adequate institutional treatment. 12 The report did not
consider, and did not even mention, the various issues addressed
by the 1978 report which have come to be the focus of judicial concern with the mental health system, such as due process and procedural requirements for involuntary emergency hospitalization,"' a
requirement of least restrictive alternative treatment, 14 and concerns such as "right to treatment" and the "right to refuse treatment."16 The focus of concern in the 1961 report was to provide for
involuntary commitment and emergency care.
Thus, to a great extent, the tone and content of the 1978 report reflects a great revolution within the past two decades in judicial recognition of the rights of persons subject to the mental
health system. Similarly, although many states have yet to give sell. JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTiON FOR MENTAL HEALTH, 1961
FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH (1961).
12. For mentally troubled people, the report recommended: "Persons who are emotionally disturbed-that is to say, under psychological stress that they cannot tolerate-should
have skilled attention and helpful counseling available to them in their community if the
development of more serious mental breakdowns is to be prevented." Id. at xii (emphasis
deleted). For acutely disturbed mental patients, the recommendation for care explicitly recognized the lack of adequate provision of mental health services at the time of the report.
The report provided that: "Immediate professional attention should be provided in the community for persons at the onset of acutely disturbed, socially disruptive, and sometimes
personally catastrophic behavior-that is, for persons suffering a major breakdown. The few
pilot programsfor immediate, or emergency, psychiatriccare presently in existence should
be expanded and extended as rapidly as personnel becomes available." Id. at xiii (emphasis
added). In other words, the concern in 1961 was for the provision for involuntary commitment and for emergency care.
13. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 421 U.S.
957 (1975) (minimal due process requirements should be met in cases of involuntary hospitalization, including notice and an opportunity to be heard, application of specified standards for commitment, provision of counsel, and application of the rules of evidence).
14. See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) where the court construed
the District of Columbia mental health code to require that the least drastic method of
treatment be provided.
15. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974), (upholding a right to treatment based on the United States Constitution and specified broad objective standards of adequacy of care to be established by quantitative determinations of personnel and consultations providing care and treatment)."
16. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) holding that patients
have a right to refuse medication in certain circumstances.
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rious attention to reform of the mental health laws, there has been
a fundamental revision of much of the statutory law governing
mental health to provide legal standards for commitment and to
establish set procedures for dealing with persons who are brought
within the control of mental health authorities.1 7 Yet, as the legal
realists so clearly showed a half-century ago, law on the books
must be distinguished from law in practice."' In the words of one
contemporary commentator: "Laws on paper are meaningless; they
must be enforced or applied. At the cutting edge of law, rules devolve upon human operators not machines. In their hands rules
may become a mockery."" There is a need, therefore, to make
some assessment of the effect of reform legislation in the field of
mental health.
In The Court of Last Resort: Mental Illness and the Law,2 0
Carol A. B. Warren, a sociologist, provides just this type of study,
thereby permitting those concerned with the law governing the
mental health system to determine the extent to which the reform
statutes and recent judicial precedents have given rise to "real"
rules governing the mental health system, in particular the process
of involuntary commitment, and the extent to which these reform
laws are merely "paper rules" providing a ritual mask for official
action. Moreover, Professor Warren's study affords an opportunity
to assess the probable effect of the reform recommendations of the
President's Commission on Mental Health on the field of mental
health, at least to the extent that those recommendations are already incorporated into the law of California, the state in which
Professor Warren conducted her study. By examining the experience in California, it is possible to determine whether the promise
of reform is real or illusory.
The statutory background against which Professor Warren's
empirical study is developed is provided by the Lanterman-Petris17.

See supra note 10.

18. This dichotomy was perhaps put best by Karl Llewellyn who distinguished between
"real rules" and "paper rules." Particularly with respect to the judicial process, Llewellyn
called for attention to the actual behavior of courts. He argued for the need to determine
"how far the paper rule is real, how far merely paper." Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 450 (1930).
19. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 790

(1967).
20.

C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW (1982).
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Short Act (LPS),2 ' the California statute first enacted in 1967. The
principal reforms instituted by this statute were the elimination of
indeterminate commitment and the removal of legal disabilities
which
formerly followed the adjudication of a person as mentally
ill. 22 LPS provides for an initial involuntary detention of seventytwo hours at an approved facility for a person found to be mentally
ill and evaluated to be a danger to himself, a danger to others, or
gravely disabled. 3 This initial detention can be with or without a
court order. 4 An allegedly mentally ill person can be committed
without a court order by a peace officer or various mental health
professionals.2 5 It is important to note that this initial detention
does not require judicial review nor appointment of counsel for the
patient. The statute does provide, however, that any person taken
into custody for examination must be informed of certain basic
rights, including the right to phone family or friends, given notice
of the nature and reason for detention, and informed that if they
are to be held for longer then seventy-two hours
they have a right
26
to counsel and a right to a judicial hearing.
Prior to the expiration of the initial seventy-two hour detention, the California statute requires the medical staff to examine
21.
22.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5401 (West Supp. 1982).

Under previous code provisions involuntary and indefinite judicial commitment followed a 72 hour detention if a person was found by two physicians and a court to be mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5550-5578 (West
1966) (repealed July 1, 1969). The legislative goal of eliminating involuntary commitment is
specifically set forth in the current statute. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5001(a) (West Supp.
1972) provides that LPS should be construed to promote the legislature's intent. "To end
the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons
...
and persons impaired by chronic alcoholism, and to eliminate legal disabilites." The
California Supreme Court recognized the broad reform purposes of this legislation in Thorn
v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970):
The LPS act, as enacted in 1967 after a two-year legislative study, and thereafter amended, repealed the principal provisions for the civil commitment of mentally ill persons found in prior California law and replaced them by a new statutory scheme repealing the indeterminate commitment, removing the legal
disabilities previously imposed upon persons adjudicated to be mentally ill, and
enacting an extensive scheme of community-based services, emphasizing voluntary treatment and providing for periods of involuntary observation and crisis
treatment for persons who are unable to care for themselves or whose condition
makes them a danger to themselves or others.
Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d at 668, 464 P.2d at 57, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
23. LPS §§ 5150, 5170.
24. Id. § 5150.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 5157.
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and evaluate the subject for the purpose of making one of four recommendations: (1) that the patient be released without further
treatment; (2) that the patient be referred for further care and
treatment on a voluntary basis; (3) that the patient be certified for
intensive treatment for not more than a fourteen day period; or (4)
that a conservator or temporary conservator be appointed for the
patient.
Conservatorship requires the appointment of a person or
agency to act as the subject's guardian and to protect his interests
on the ground that the subject is unable to care for himself.28 Such

a conservator may make determinations of need and arrangements
to the extent necessary for the subject's food, clothing, shelter, and
treatment. The appointment of a conservator is accomplished by
filing a petition with the court specifying the subject's disability
and naming a suitable person or agency to serve as conservator. 2
The basis for certification for the additional fourteen day period of involuntary treatment must be that the patient is mentally
disabled and as a consequence of such disorder is either a danger
to himself or others, or is gravely disabled.30 The petition for an
additional period must be filed by a professional in charge of the
treating facility and must indicate that medical examinations show
that the subject is mentally disabled, that he refuses to remain in
the facility on a voluntary basis, and that the facility is capable of
treating his disability.3 1 Although a court hearing is not required as
a matter of course to permit this additional fourteen day period of
treatment, the subject must receive notice of the required certification 2 and must be informed of his right to counsel and to judicial
review by petition for a writ of habeas corpus." The patient must
be granted a hearing in a trial court within two days after filing
such a petition. In order to authorize continued confinement, the
court is required to determine that there has been no violation of
the subject's rights and that the patient is not being held without
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. §§ 5152, 5250.
Id. §§ 5350-5368.
Id. § 5350.
Id. § 5250.
Id. §§ 5250, 5251.
Id. §§ 5252, 5253.
Id. § 5252.1.
Id. §§ 5252.1, 5276.
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good cause. 5 In addition to written notice of certification and a
statement of his rights, the patient must receive an oral explanation of his rights to file a petition and to engage counsel or to have
counsel appointed.36
At the conclusion of the fourteen day period of involuntary
treatment further involuntary detention must be justified on one
of three grounds: danger to others, 7 danger to self,8 or grave disability and need of conservatorship.3 9 Each of these grounds has its
own statutory criteria which must be met to authorize additional
treatment. 0
LPS provides for a ninety day "postcertification hold" for a
patient considered to be dangerous to others. 1 In order to qualify
as dangerous to others, the patient must be shown to have
threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm upon another
person, either at the time of being taken into custody or while in
custody, and must be evaluated as presenting an imminent threat
of substantial harm to others as a result of mental disorder. 2 A
court hearing is required before such a certification in order to determine whether or not the person should be detained for an additional ninety day period. 3 If the patient so requests, he is entitled
to a jury trial on the issue of whether he is imminently dangerous.
If a jury trial is requested, it must commence within ten days of
the filing of the required certification petition, unless a continu35. Id. § 5276.
36. Id. §§ 5252.1, 5276.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 41-46.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 51-58.
40. LPS § 5001(d) provides that one of the purposes of the statute is to safeguard individual rights through judicial review. It should be observed that a person involuntarily committed because of attempted or threatened suicide can be held for 31 days without judicial
hearing unless one is specifically requested by the patient by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See supra text accompanying notes 26 & 33, and infra text accompanying
note 50.
41. Id. § 5300. This provision provides for the most extensive form of involuntary treatment, since a patient can be committed for successive 90-day periods upon a certification of
dangerousness to others. However, it is important to observe that this provision is seldom
invoked. See ENKI REsARcH INsTrruTs, A STUDy OF CALxORNsA'S NEw MInTAL HALTH
LAw (1969-1971), at 154 (1972). The reason for the infrequent use of this provision, according to Professor Warren, is the difficulty in predicting dangerousness of a patient C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 27.
42. LPS § 5304.
43. Id.
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ance is requested by the patient's attorney." If the patient elects
not to have a jury, the court must proceed to hear the case within
four days of the filing of the certification, again, unless a continuance is requested by the patient.45 At the conclusion of the ninety
day period, the patient must be released unless a new certificate is
filed meeting all requirements set out above with the same procedural due process, including a judicial hearing.4 6 Thus, a commitment based on dangerousness to others requires a judicial hearing
every ninety days.
The second basis for extended involuntary treatment is a
showing of dangerousness to self on the basis that the patient has
threatened or attempted to take his own life during a previous
holding period or was taken into custody following such a threat or
attempt.'7 Satisfaction of this criterion will justify an additional
fourteen day period of involuntary treatment, a significantly
shorter period than the ninety day hold allowed where a showing is
made of dangerousness to others.48 Moreover, treatment and confinement beyond this fourteen day period cannot be justified by
risk of suicide; rather, further detention requires the patient be reclassified as dangerous to others or as gravely disabled.49 The additional fourteen day period of treatment does not require a court
hearing. The patient must, however, be given notice of certification
and informed of his right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.5 0
The third basis for extended treatment requires establishing
that the subject is gravely disabled by a showing that he is unable
to provide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter. 1 Upon such a showing, the court may appoint a conservator,
which may be a person or an agency, to provide for the subject's
basic needs.52 During the period of the conservatorship, the subject
may be permitted to reside outside a mental institution, 3 or may
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. § 5303."
Id.
Id. § 5304.
Id. §§ 5260-5268.
Id. § 5260.
Id. § 5264.
Id. § 5263.
Id. §§ 5008(h)(1), 5350.
Id. § 5350.
Id. § 5352.
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be committed to a mental institution for an indefinite period."
The subject has a right to judicial review of his status every six
months,55 and there is a mandatory judicial review each year"6
since the conservatorship automatically terminates at the end of
one year and may be continued only by petition of the conservator.
The subject also has the right to a jury trial on the issue of continuing mental disability and his gravely disabled status.5
This, then, in broad outline, is the statutory scheme governing
involuntary commitment in California, and it is against this legislative background that Professor Warren provides an empirical evaluation of the operation of the institutional and judicial process of
involuntary commitment. Two basic questions permeate the text of
The Court of Last Resort: (1) what has been the effect of this legislation as measured by the decisions of a court administering the
statute? and (2) what is the extent of compliance with the stated
purpose 8 and formal requirements of this statutory scheme?
In an effort to develop a response to these questions, Professor
Warren has provided a text which is broadly divided into conceptual and empirical analyses of the operation of the mental health
system. The first part provides an overview of the conceptual
framework in which mental health decisions are made; here the focus is on legal standards, psychiatric theory, and sociological
presuppositions which provide the framework for mental health
decision making.59 The second part provides an account of the operation of a court involved in mental health decision making, and
an account of the activity of other important participants in the
decision making process including attorneys, medical personnel,
and the subjects of commitment themselves.60
Warren's study is supplemented by two independently authored papers on the issue of the desirability of maintaining a pro54. Id. § 5358.
55. Id. § 5364.
56. Id. § 5361.
57. Id. § 5350(d). California courts have held that the due process clause of the United
States Constitution requires the standard of proof in conservatorship proceedings for persons with grave disability, to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, any jury
proceedings conducted under these provisions require a unanimous verdict for commitment.
See Estate of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979).
58. C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 39-42.
59. Id. at 19-68.
60. Id. at 135-213.
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gram of involuntary commitment. The first paper is by a legal
scholar, Stephen Morse, who argues against continuing a program
of involuntary commitment on two principal grounds: 1) the inadequacy of medical diagnosis and treatment, and 2) a preference for
individual autonomy and responsibility over state intervention on

any paternalistic basis."1 The second paper is by Jack Zusman, a
medical doctor, who argues for retention of a program of involuntary commitment based on the reality of mental disorder, the oc-

currence of dysfunctional behavior which is destructive and dangerous, and the inability of the critically mentally ill to act freely
and rationally.6 2 Additionally, Warren includes a significant appendix describing her methodology and, more importantly, suggesting

the ways in which her study is likely affected by her own values,
biases, and conflicts with the personnel and institutions which are

the focus of her study."3
Professor Warren identifies three elements which provide the
legal framework for decision making in the involuntary commitment procedure: first, the institutional setting-Warren's primary
focus is on the court and the personnel involved in the processing
of individual cases; 4 second, the legal framework provided not

only by express statutory provisions, but also by broad jurisprudential limits such as the stated purpose of the legislation being
61. Id. at 69-109. Professor Morse's paper is entitled A Preference for Liberty: The
Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered (presented at the 6th
International Symposium on Law and Psychiatry, Charlottesville, Va., June 1981). An expanded version of this paper has been published, under the same title, in the California Law
Review. 70 CALiF. L. REv. 54 (1982). Professor Morse has contributed a significant number
of articles to the legal literature of the subject of mental illness and the question of involuntary commitment. See generally Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility:
Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971 (1982); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals,
and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. Rav. 527 (1978); Morse, The
Twilight of Welfare Criminology:A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1976);
The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Final Word, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 11275 (1976).
62. C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 110-33. Doctor Zusman's paper is entitled The Need
for Intervention: The Reasons for State Control of the Mentally Disabled.
63. C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 215-39. This "Appendix on Methods" has significance
beyond the subject of this study itself. This highly personal statement suggests inherent
limits on the sociological study of law, as well as providing those who are subject to or who
might use such studies with significant observations about their limits and their necessarily
subjective cast.
64. See id., where the author states: "This study is about decision making in a court of
law... . The purpose of the research is to examine the individual, interpersonal, organizational, and interorganizational elements which enter into decision making." Id. at 1.
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applied; 65 and third, conceptual notions as well as shared understandings about the nature of mental illness.6 8 Throughout this
study, the author stresses a tension between what she identifies as
the "ideal" and the "material," by which she means a tension between the language and stated policy of mental health laws and the
actual decision making processes, which are influenced by unacknowledged social and economic factors and by the relationships
7
between the various persons involved in decision making.
In considering the first element of the legal framework for
mental health decision making, the institutional setting, Warren
devotes particular attention to the interests, motivations, and effects of the personalities of the persons participating in involuntary commitment hearings. The participants include not only the
judge and the petitioner, but also counsel and psychiatric witnesses.6 8 The author stresses the "middle class" values of official
personnel and the probably "lower class," and most certainly "eccentric," status of the petitioner."'
Warren further observes that the commitment hearing, and
for that matter the mental health system generally, is affected by
what she denominates the "labelling" process.7 0 According to labelling theory, designations of mental illness result not from the existence of objectively determined disability, but from the identification by authorities of certain persons as deviant. Once made, this
identification has a reflexive effect on the persons labelled, who are
then viewed as deviant not only by others but also by themselves.
According to the theory, this effect in turn influences how these
persons are treated by medical personnel and how they themselves
65.

Chapter 2 of THE CouaRT o LAST RasoaT provides a broad overview of the statute

with attention to the social setting in which the enactment was adopted and an account of
some of the problematic features of the involuntary commitment law. See id., at 21-43. The

account of the statute is brief and somewhat impressionistic. This review has as one of its
goals the presentation of a more systematic account of these statutory provisions, against
which the observations and empirical data of Professor Warren can be measured. See supra
text and accompanying notes 21-57.
66. See C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 44-68.
67. Id. at 1-2.

68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 14.
70. Id. at 5. See generally Gove, Societal Reaction as an Explanation of Mental Illness: An Evaluation, 35 Am. Soc. Rev. 873, 873-84 (1970). But see Murphy, Psychiatric
Labeling in Cross-CulturalPerspective, 191 Sci. 1019, 1019-28 (1976).
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act in the hospital setting.71 Middle class values, then, lead the
participants in the commitment decision to view eccentric behavior
as deviant, dangerous, and as evidence of mental illness; labelling
leads to the designation of persons as deviant and the treatment of
these persons as ill or dangerous, causing a reaction which can become a confirmation of the designation.
In addition to the effect of class-related values and labelling,
Warren notes the inherent potential conflict between legal authorities and medical personnel7 2 and its failure to actually materialize.
While there is a deep philosophical conflict between legal theory,
with its emphasis on free choice, and psychiatric-medical theory,
which is rooted in notions of determinism,7 3 Professor Warren suggests that the potential conflict in the decision making process is
largely averted by a pragmatic orientation by all personnel, both
medical and legal, who are involved in the process of
commitment. 4
The second element of the framework for decision making in
involuntary commitment cases, the mental health law itself, provides an important part of the framework, albeit only a part. Warren emphasizes the need to consider the policy commitments underlying the statute's enactment and their effect on the
administration of the statute as well as the statute itself. To this
end, she points out the shift from major emphasis on paternalism
in the earlier mental health law to a new emphasis on the liberty
71. C. WARmEN, supra note 20, at 19.
72. Id. at 16-17.
73. See, C. WARREN, note 20, supra at 190. See also, Roberts, Some Observations on
the Problem of the ForensicPsychiatrist,1965 Wis. L. Rav. 240, where it is observed:
The inter-professional differences become clear when one looks at criminal law.
This segment of law focuses primarily on the crime with emphasis on intent and
with lessor regard for motivation. On the other hand, psychiatry remains concerned with the criminal rather than the crime. The psychiatrist considers criminal intent as a manifestation of the underlying motivation of the criminal. The
legal concept, which appears to separate the actor from the act, the criminal
from the crime, is at variance with the view of the psychiatrist.
Id. at 242.
74. Warren suggests that the potential for conflict is avoided by all parties subscribing
to common sense notions of mental illness, responsibility, and autonomy. See C. WARREN,
supra note 20, at 140, where the author observes: "Although the medical and legal frames
may appear to conflict on the surface, there is an underlying commonsense and a taken-forgranted perspective on mental illness." This results, it is asserted, in the meshing of "the
roles of the participants into a neatly functioning unit." Id. at 140.
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and rights of persons subjected to the mental health law. 75 At the
same time, Warren stresses that considerable effect is given to the
police function through the administration of the mental health
law, not only in terms of providing protection from dangerous persons, but also in providing relief from socially disruptive persons,
particularly where there is a showing of impaired functioning of
the family unit which can be remedied by commitment.7 6
Warren shows that the administration of the mental health
law is further affected by social and economic considerations not
explicitly recognized in the statutory provisions. Primary among
these factors is the fiscal. In Warren's view, the adoption of the
California statute itself, with its emphasis on less restrictive alternative treatment, was in part a consequence of reduced funding for
mental health treatment. While reformers urged the adoption of
the least restrictive form of confinement consistent with patient
needs on therapeutic and civil libertarian grounds, it is important
to note that the legislature was largely moved by fiscal considerations. Costly hospitalization was to be replaced with less expensive
alternatives such as nursing homes, day-care centers, and community health clinics."'
A third aspect of the legal framework is created by decisions
and practices of the courts applying the mental health laws. The
practical influence of the courts has led to supplementation of the
statutory provisions by a developing case law which has given increased recognition to such matters as the right to treatment, right
to refuse treatment, and a right to the least restrictive treatment
75. Id. at 23-24.
76. Id. at 24, 175. Warren concludes "that considerations of individual rights and the
protection of society are displaced in this court by considerations of the relief of family
tensions and the smooth functioning of the mental health system." Id. at 175.
77. Id. at 22. Warren argues that this has not necessarily resulted in a more benign
mental health system, since in her experience these alternatives have largely been relegated
to the private sector where the profit motive has undermined the provision of adequate
treatment. Id. at 203-07. The author's evaluation of this "transinstitutionalism" is expressed
in strongly critical terms:
[D]ata from New York, Hawaii, California, and other states mainly concern the
fate of those poor and/or elderly mental patients who have been de-institutionalized from the state mental hospitals. However, the poor and the elderly are not
the only "social junk" who can be transformed "into a commodity from which
various 'professionals' and entrepreneurs can extract a profit." Adolescents-both from poor families and from the not-so-poor-can also be socially
problematic and candidates for social control.
Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
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setting.781 As importantly, the explicit legal framework of the statute has been limited by various procedural and evidentiary rules
adopted by the courts administering the statute. These include
lack of a right to counsel at psychiatric examinations and use of
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for issues decided
under the mental health law.7 1 Most important, however, is the
treatment of problematic concepts in the statute in a manner that
subjects the process of commitment to less rigorous proof and procedure than was intended by the legislature in adopting the statute. The major difficulties stem from the standards for commitment which require proof of dangerousness. Warren observes that
not only is the definition and prediction of dangerousness difficult,
but psychiatrists tend to overpredict dangerousness. 0 Moreover,
Warren finds that in practice the problematic features of showing
the continued dangerousness of persons originally confined on an
unlitigated determination of dangerousness to self or others are in
fact avoided by a shift in the basis for continued confinement from
"dangerous" to "gravely disabled." 81
The legal context of involuntary commitment is complemented by the third element of the decision making framework
cited by Warren, the theoretical orientations of the various participants in the mental health system toward. mental illness, as well as
the effect of diagnosis of mental illness itself. Warren identifies two
competing theoretical orientations. The first is labelling theory
which emphasizes the use of the designation of madness to identify
certain unacceptable social behavior without any implication that
there is any "real" underlying disorder.8 2 The second is the medical model which asserts the existence of a physiological or psycho83
logical condition which results in impaired personal functioning.
While these competing perspectives are hotly debated in the literature, Warren reports that this debate has little effect on the actual
78. Id. at 31-35.
79. Id. at 29-31. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (Supreme Court holding
that in a civil commitment hearing the state must bear the burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence).
80. Id. at 35-36. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH (1978).
81. C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 37, 39-42.
82. Id. at 45-48. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, THE MYrH OF MENTAL ILLNEsS (rev. ed. 1974).
83. C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 45, 48-49. See, e.g., P. CONRAD & J. SCHNEIDER, DavxANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS (1980).
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functioning of the mental health courts since participants adopt
what she calls a "topos or commonsense model of mental illness."84
Rather than employing one of the two models, attorneys and court
personnel tend to refer to subjects as "sick, crazy, weird, different
or hopeless."' 5 In response to the questions asked by Warren of
one psychiatrist: "What type of people come here?" the elicited
response was: "Crazy ones." 8 Everyday notions of craziness thus
become the basis of involuntary commitment.
In addition to the tendency toward the use of a common sense
notion of mental illness in the mental health decision making process, the author identifies two other operational features of the system. The first, and perhaps most important, is that the diagnosis
of a person as mentally ill goes largely unchallenged in the commitment process.8 7 Adversary presentation and argument are limited to the issue of dangerousness or the establishment of grave
disability.8 8 Secondly, the fact that someone has been labelled
mentally ill or merely brought within the mental health system affects not only how the person is treated by medical personnel, but
also how the person is viewed by legal authorities, and may additionally affect the self-view and behavior of the subject himself
with direct consequences for any judicial proceeding in which the
person may be included. These two factors can obviously have a
tremendous effect on the outcome of the decision making process
of the mental health tribunal. In a sense, they create effective presumptions that certainly are not intended by the statute.
This account of the framework for decision making in cases of
involuntary commitment already suggests that the bare bones rules
of the mental health law do not alone determine case outcomes.
However, only by consideration of actual decisions can one assess
the effectiveness of the mental h~alth law. Such an assessment is
the focus of the second part of The Court of Last Resort, which
involves an examination of one hundred and thirty cases before a
84. C. WMRN, supra note 20, at 138-39.
85. Id. at 140.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 164, where Warren reports: "[T]he finding of mental disorder was routine and
illustrated the accepted practice of using psychiatric testimony to establish mental disorder
in law.. . . In practice, district attorneys and public defenders rarely challenged psychiatric
diagnosis.. . ." Id. at 164.
88. Id. at 164-65.
89. Id. at 50-67.
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mental health court in Los Angeles County in 1979 involving petitions for habeas corpus filed by persons involuntarily committed to
the mental health system and an observational study of one hundred persons found mentally disordered and gravely disabled, dangerous to self, or dangerous to others.9 0
In setting out to evaluate empirically the operation of the
mental health court, Warren identifies four hypotheses which she
undertakes to test: (1) an organizational perspective which predicts
that outcomes will be a product of court organization; (2) the legal
perspective which suggests that outcomes will be based on the
terms of the law; (3) the conflict perspective which maintains that
outcomes will be based on qualities of the subject of the proceedings; and (4) the individual perspective which holds that outcomes
will be determined by qualities of the decision making judge.9 1 The
most important finding Warren reports is that the statutory criteria for civil commitment, which she judges to be vague, are not
strictly applied. 2
Warren finds that the stated intent of the statute being applied, as well as its explicit language, is blunted by several factors.
Chief among these is the use of "common sense" notions of mental
illness rather than the legal categories established in the statute."3
A second factor is the adoption of an informal relationship of cooperation rather than maintenance of strong adversarial stances in
the courtroom. She observes that the attorneys who represented
mental health clients, whether they were public defenders or private attorneys, did not make aggressive advocacy presentations but
rather gave the impression of uncritically accepting the psychiatrist's testimony." Psychiatrists were generally treated as "'unimpeachable witnesses.' "5 More importantly, Warren finds that a ju90. Warren reports that in 1979 in Los Angeles County 9,778 persons were involuntarily
confined on 14-day writs. Of those involuntarily committed, 2,796 filed petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. Of those who filed petitions, 298 were released by the hospitals, 282 were
changed to voluntary status, 40 escaped, 628 were discharged after the writ was issued, 620
were released on stipulation from the court, and 972 proceeded to a hearing. Of the 972
writs which were heard, 255 were released and 660 were not released. Of the 130 cases studied by Warren, 49.9% had their petitions granted and were released, 47.7% had their writs
denied. Id. at 155-56.
91. Id. at 157.
92. Id. at 175.
93. Id. at 153.
94. Id. at 139.
95. Id.
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dicial informality and a sometimes "joking" demeanor intrudes
into the process98 and that the proceedings themselves are characterized by a ritual quality manifested in stock questions and responses.9 7 All of these influences are viewed by Warren as obstructing justice, rendering the process "vulnerable
to charges of
98
lack of justice, cynicism, or even corruption.
In the examination of the habeas corpus proceedings which
were a major focus of this study, and about half of which resulted
in denial of relief, Warren reaches a number of significant conclusions. The greatest attention to statutory criteria occurred in petitions where commitment was based on danger to self.99 Yet even
here great emphasis was placed on the willingness or lack of willingness of family members to take charge of the patient, rather
than simple consideration of evidence showing future danger of suicide. Generally, there was little evidence of future danger
presented in any of the cases. 100 As noted above, the category of
dangerousness to others was usually avoided, with the adoption in
most cases of the gravely disabled standard as the basis for further
confinement. 10 1 Again, under the gravely disabled category, great
stress was placed on whether family members were willing to take
charge of the patient. As to the initial requirement of mental disorder, few patients were not labelled mentally disordered, and the
most common diagnosis was scAizophrenia, either paranoid or
undifferentiated. 1 2
Apart from the application of medical and legal criteria, Warren makes a number of additional significant observations. There
appeared to be little significance given to race or ethnicity in the
decision to commit, nor did sex or age seem to affect the decision."0 3 In addition to the willingness of the family to assume responsibility for the petitioner,'" factors favoring release included:
willingness of the patient to take medication, lack of prior hospitalization, lack of delusions or hallucinations, and the fact that no
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 165-68. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
C. WARREN, supra note 20, at 164-65.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 161.
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conservatorship petition was pending. 10 5 Another factor which
played an important role in the decision to release was the absence
of physical threats or attacks by the subject."" Warren questions
the appropriateness and relevance to the legal basis for commitment of some of these factors, particularly prior hospitalization
and absence of a pending conservatorship petition.
The willingness of family members to take responsibility for
the petitioner is also questioned as to its appropriateness and relevance as a factor in the decision to discharge.1 0 7 Warren argues
that the emphasis on family care reflects the class orientation of
the judicial decision maker. The petitioner, who is likely to be, according to Warren, a "socially marginal" person, is just that type
of person who is unlikely to have available extended family support.1 08 Further, Warren suggests that this emphasis on availability
of "sponsorship of family members" threatens the integrity of the
mental health law by transforming it from a scheme to provide
care for the mentally disordered who are dangerous or disabled to
a mechanism serving "as a kind of safety valve for families of mentally disordered persons" seeking relief from the stress and tension
created by the presence of the mentally disordered person. 10
Beyond the legal criteria and the behavioral and social factors
which influence decisions of the mental health court, Warren identifies various organizational features of the mental health system
which influence decisions (she prefers the term "network" to "system" since it suggests a greater degree of openness to external influences).110 Three principal factors are identified: resource availability, number of subjects or clients, and personnel needs and
loyalties. 1 Warren maintains that availability of resources, including financial resources, has a direct outcome on commitment decisions. She suggests that a lack of financial resources might lead
hospitals to encourage filing of petitions, or lead a court to release
in order to give relief to "beleaguered" hospitals.11 2 The need for
patients and overcrowding are also conditions which can affect hos105. Id.
106. Id. at 171.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 176.
at 168.
at 178.
at 180-81.
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pitals' release decisions. According to Warren, "Clients are resources, as well as money.. . . A working, adequate number of clients is a desirable resource; none, and the organization might not
exist, too many, and it might be overwhelmed."11 3 The working relationship based on these concerns and needs between the hospital
and the court and attorneys has an influence on case outcomes.
Warren observes that an amicable, routine relationship existed between the court and the state mental hospitals, while a degree of
hostility existed between the court and private and federal hospitals. 114 The degree of hostility was measured in terms of required
testimony from treating psychiatrists. Some private hospitals were
required to provide such testimony, while reports were accepted
from general hospital staff in the case of state hospitals.1 16 The use
of the "gravely disabled" standard in place of a "dangerous" standard is itself judged by Warren to be the result of inter-organizational cooperation aimed at "a de facto continuation of the more
psychiatric and less legal involuntary commitment standard that
prevailed in California" prior to adoption of the reform statute.'1 6
Warren is led to the conclusion that official self-interest and interorganizational needs have led to a significant erosion of the intended legal reforms embodied in LPS and to a compromise of justice in decision making. Warren concludes: "The idiosyncratic and
organizational features of decision making in the [mental health]
court are obvious to the long-term observer to [sic] the court. ...
[They] add to the sense of justice not done, . . . to the topos and
informal ' ' ritual
of the court, and to the particularism of decision
making." , 7
Based on her empirical and observational study, Warren
comes to view the decisions of the mental health court as too "particularistic, situational, and arbitrary."1 8 To a great extent she
sees this situation as following in part from medical diagnosis being accepted as proven fact, and partly from personnel and organizational needs taking precedence over legal and psychiatric re113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

180.
183-84.
185-87.
193.
199.
211.
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quirements." 9 Her evaluation is that "[ilustice is not done in
involuntary civil commitment."' 2 Nevertheless, two principal convictions lead her to argue for the continuation of the present process. First, she views mental illness as a reality in which there is an
obvious loss of control and dysfunctional behavior.1 2 Second, she
views the available alternatives of de-institutionalization and use
of nursing homes as inadequate.1 22 These alternatives, which utilize
the private sector, are viewed as primarily operated for profit without any effective provision of social support and treatment for the
persons relegated to them. 2 3
As to further reform, Warren does not believe it desirable to
provide greater judicial control of commitment by requiring judicial review of all temporary commitments (in California this could
include the seventy-two hour holds, or at least all fourteen day
holds).' 2 ' She argues that there is already too much legal and psychiatric expertise in the system. Rather, she suggests the desirability of more administrative and lay-dominated control of the involuntary commitment system. 25 While favoring a system of
voluntary commitment, Warren suggests that a halfway reform
should be directed at reducing organizational control of the system, with greater challenge to what she views as the "pseudoscientific rhetoric" of an expert dominated system. 2 ' She suggests more
frequent rotation of judges and attorneys in the mental health
court and efforts at reducing the "assembly line justice" quality of
current proceedings as immediate reforms. 12 7 Her concern is less
with the actual decisions the courts have rendered than with what
she considers the apparent injustice of the present system. Thus
she does not, in the end, object to the use of common sense notions
of mental illness, since for her they are no less legitimate than the
legal and psychiatric concepts used in the present statutory
framework.' 2 8
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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The value of The Court of Last Resort lies in the empirical
and observational information it provides about the actual operation of the procedure of involuntary commitment under a reform
mental health statute. Warren's study makes it clear that the policies and explicit terms of the statute are blunted by the influence
of a number of factors. Nevertheless, one must seriously question
some of the evaluative conclusions which are reached in The Court
of Last Resort. A court that gives serious consideration to whether
the family of a petitioner is willing to provide care or whether a
conservatorship proceeding is pending is going beyond the criteria
in the statute. Yet these considerations seem to be proper for a
court which must take some responsibility for the welfare of mentally disabled and non-functioning persons. Moreover, the evaluative conclusions of The Court of Last Resort seem tainted by what
appears to be an excessive hostility on the part of the author toward legal and medical expertise. This hostility leads the author to
prefer lay decision making over expert determination in this area
of law. For those, like the present reviewer, who accept that there
is a medical basis for mental disorder and who view legal decision
makers more capable of evaluating the applicability of a complex
legal-medical standard than lay persons, the author's conclusions
appear to a large degree unfounded.
Perhaps one of the gravest deficiencies in the evaluative stance
of the author is either a misunderstanding or rejection of the notion of judicial discretion. Warren seems to believe that a court
should operate within the statutory framework in a somewhat
mechanistic manner producing determinate decisions when the evidence before it is evaluated against the standards of the statute.
Throughout The Court of Last Resort there is a current of criticism which finds decisions, to the extent that they are "particularistic" rather than "universalistic," to be tainted by the appearance
of injustice.1"' But justice requires an effort to reconcile the general
requirements of the law with the individual features of the case
before the court. Principled judicial discretion, by which I mean
decisions based on articulated reasons, provides a needed supplement to the explicit terms of a statute such as a mental health
code.
While the legal realists argued for a need to differentiate be129.

See, e.g., id. at 154, 199.
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tween law on the books and law in practice, they did not take the
position that law in practice was unjust to the extent that it varied
from the law on the books. In relation to involuntary commitment,
one may object to the disregard of the statutory framework and
the apparently manipulative use of categories, such as "gravely disabled," for continued hospitalization. Moreover, one may fault
counsel for not providing effective representation if they fail to
properly examine psychiatric witnesses or challenge adverse evidence. It is quite another thing to see as objectionable consideration of factors such as family care or rationing of scarce hospital
resources in the face of overwhelming demand. It seems quite appropriate for a court to make hospital utilization determinations
based on the relative needs of various persons subject to involuntary hospitalization where all subjects cannot be accommodated.
Finally, I would lile to differ with'Professor Warren's suggestions for further reform of the involuntary commitment law. Warren rejects increased judicial supervision of involuntary commitment by requiring court review of all seventy-two hour or fourteen
day holds under LPS. In part, this rejection stems from an admitted hostility to judicial expertise. Nevertheless, involuntary hospitalization involves a significant deprivation of liberty, potential
stigmatization, and limitation of personal autonomy. Given these
costs to the person hospitalized, it would seem that family members, police, or even intake medical personnel are not the proper
parties to make the commitment decision, no matter how short the
period of involuntary confinement. Whenever possible, independent judicial evaluation of the propriety of commitment should be
made by a magistrate.
Warren suggests that reform should lead to rotation of legal
personnel and utilization of lay decision making. However, the process of commitment is to be governed by legal standards and based
on medical diagnosis of mental disorder. While application of these
criteria may always be tempered by common sense notions, it is
quite a long step to suggest that legal and medical criteria should
be replaced with lay common sense opinions of what is crazy or
bizarre. To the extent that formal legal standards are involved and
medical diagnosis required, the more expertise which can be
brought to bear on a case, the more likely that a proper decision
will be reached. One of the reasons that there has been such poor
representation of those brought within the mental health system in
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the past is that attorneys very often lack familiarity with the system and are ignorant of the nature of mental disease itself.130
More, not less, expertise would seem appropriate.
Warren's defense of continuation of the present process of involuntary hospitalization stems in part from her judgment of the
inadequacy of institutional alternatives, especially for-profit nursing homes, day-care centers, and outpatient clinics. Certainly Warren is correct in her assessment of the inadequacy of the present
operation of these facilities in providing adequate care and shelter.
But her critical view of capitalist enterprise leads her to reject outright the possibility of these institutional alternatives ever providing adequate care. However, rather than rejecting a program of alternative institutionalization which requires the use of least
restrictive alternatives, it would seem prudent to urge more effective state regulation of these facilities. Such alternative institutions
continue to offer a greater promise of autonomy and appropriate
care and treatment for a large number of mentally disabled persons than the overcrowded wards of state hospitals or a program of
premature and irresponsible release of persons unable to provide
effectively for themselves. 131
The concerns identified in the report of the President's Commission on Mental Health in 1978 with the availability and quality
of treatment for the mentally ill and with the recognition of a wide
array of rights for mental health patients are well-founded. The
Court of Last Resort shows that these concerns cannot be met by
statutory reform alone. Adequate funding, trained legal personnel,
and individualization, rather than routine diagnosis by medical
personnel, will be required to give effect to statutory reform. Most
important, however, is an understanding of, and commitment to,
the needs of the mentally ill by all those involved in the administration of reform mental health legislation.

130. See generally 4 PREswENr's COM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT OF THE TASK
PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, in IV 1978 TASK PANEL REPORTS app. (1978).

131. See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
PracticalGuides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972).

